
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10145-10429
RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 55-06-23

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/13/1978
PAGES : 30

SUBJECTS :

AMLASH
CIA, INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT OF 1977
CIA, FILES
AMTRUCK

DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/31/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 31

Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 53080 Date:
06-05-2017

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT				
TO: THE SENATE, CIA SECURITY OFFICE HOUSE SELECT COM. ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES		FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel Central Intelligence Agency Room 7 D 35 Washington, D.C. 20505 7 MAY 73		
THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:				
INFORMATION		ACTION	RETENTION	LOAN
CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)		CLASS
		NOTES OF MARK FLANNAGAN 11112654-11112651 HBA		S
				19627
RECEIPT				
SIGNATURE (acknowledging receipt of above documents)		RETURN TO		
DATE OF RECEIPT		OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROOM 7 D 35 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505		
FORM 3772B 10-76		1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY 2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD B 3 - CANARY, OLC HOLD BACK		

July 13, 1978

T. MARK FLANNAGAN
HECA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CIA
7-13-78
Wash, D.C.

Inspector General's Report - 1977-

Subj: Comments on Book II, SSC Final Report - The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies.

Introduction

~~SECRET~~

- states the principal theme of Book II is the possibility of retaliatory theory by Castro & that the CIA operations specifically may have caused any possible actions by Castro.
- the CIA notes that many tensions between the U.S. & U.S.S.R. & Cuba existed at the time-
- p 3- states that the persons involved at a senior level in the invest of 1964 (Warner Comm) are no longer in the CIA
- primary reliance placed on the records; looked into all Cuban operations & carefully analyzed the content & nature with sp. attention to security contained in TABS B-G.
- CIA also conducted an invest. looking at the "other end" - to see if a theoretical provocation theory could have occurred.
- feels that the SSC tried to make AMLASH fit the pattern, (p5)
- Report concludes that the WC invest. the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement & did not find it - since the WC did not report anything it did not exist "To hold differently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined conspiracy to suppress evidence. (p5)

11112654

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

p.6 - AMTRUNK operation, started in 1963,

- purpose - join dissident elements in Cuban leadership in effort to oust Castro. - slow in developing; little progress during JFK's life. In 1965, it was believed to be compromised & CIA withdrew from the operation.

- states that there are basic questions about the security of the operation. - Castro could have known from the beginning.
- since it did not develop momentum until after JFK's death, probably not related.

p.6 AMLASH - SSC says that this operation planned Castro's assassination preceding the murder of JFK; the CIA holds otherwise. "prior to the Pres.' assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH /1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro." (p.7)

11112655

- Rpt then says that the SSC was offered this confirming evidence but dismissed it out of hand as false - SSC would only admit that AMLASH /1 was at least indiscreet in his actions. Rpt says that the SSC suggests that he "may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the US into a plot against Castro's life which is then ~~was~~ was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination." (p.7)

SECRET

- Rpt says that had Castro learned of AMLASH,

~~SECRET~~

he would only know that an inconclusive relationship existed.

TAB A

- - response to Book II object - study group established to view the problem - chaired by a rep. from the O of IG - also consisted of members from CI staff, LA Division, & OS. (p 1)

Two points emphasized.

- 1) "to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba, and by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy." (p 1-2)

- main files for the period held in
LA DIVISION } Directorate of Operations
CI STAFF }
- also less voluminous files held in OS & IG. (p. 2)

11112656

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LA DIVISION - file review from 1 Jan 61
to 1 Jan 65. (p.2)

- research group composed of 5 full-time
researcher, a group leader & a task
force supervisor. - an additional 4
researchers participated in different phases.
(p.2)

Types & Number of Fils. Rvd (p.3)

(1) Operational

(601 with findings and 1,128 1,729
with no findings)

(2) Subject files

(186 with findings & 361 547
with no findings)

(3) Cella Policy Fils

101

(4) Chief, WH DIVISION Chrono Fils)
(TASK FORCE W Chronos)

37

(5) Official 201 Dossiers

100-plus

TOTAL 2,514

11112657

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- the rpt also notes that as a result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuban desk, in August 1975, this had traces of the names that appeared in the so-called Black Book that Castro passed to McGovern. (p 4)

C.I. STAFF

- assigned me senior officer to review the files on LHO.

"Oswald File" - so called - now fills 57 volumes - comprises some 142 file folders and portfolios. - has also accumulated some 50 supplemental files.

- this is now the Agency's central repository for info. & documentation
- a. Life of LHO
- b. Agency's role in the investigation 1963-64
- c. testimony by various Agency officers before several commissions & committees
- d. FOIA request responses. (p 6)

11112658

Office of Security

- assigned me officer to identify material; included volume on LHO, AMLASH, various ind. connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of names concerning name trace conducted at the time of the Garrison investigation. p 8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office of Ins. General

- two members of staff - also employed on a contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding JFK's death & during the invest. aftermath. - conducted an extensive review of all Mex city records. p 9

~~ACCORD~~

Terms of Reference Agreement 4 Aug 76

p. 6 - signed by
S.D. Breckinridge
OIG

Robert Wall OI
William Sturbitts LA Division
Raymond Beardon OS

TAB B CIA Performance ON THE INQUIRIES

p. 1 - says that Book II of the SCC Final Report portrayed a pattern of neglect not supported by the evidence.

11112652

- mentions "D"

AM LASH - p(2)

Oswald's band p. 3-5

- this section deals with Book II allegations of mishandling various aspects of the investigation - it does not deal with the relaxation ideas.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

p.10 - mentions the two Cabana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November & 27 NOV 1963 -

p.11 - CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cabana flights - filing cable reports to hdqtrs.
- one unilateral CIA surveillance team - LIFIRE - reported on departure & arrivals.

p.11 - also, a telephone operation (LIFE NOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cuban office & the Mex. Airport Control Office.

TABC CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA

p.6 - areas of operational activity

1. Oper. directed against Cuban leadership - AMTRUNK 11112680
2. Oper. involving the criminal underworld
3. Other reports to assassinate Castro.

Operation AMTRUNK - p. 7

- to develop capability for splitting the leadership of Cuba & eventual overthrow never reached the point of implementation -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- p. 7 early 1963 - two Cuban exiles - wished to change Cuba
{ Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
Enrique Cayardo Lora
developed operational concept "Lemard Plan"
- p. 8 - assoc of Moreno was Jorge Aykroyd Volsky - in Miami in 1961.
- p. 8 Cayardo & Moreno - discussed plan with Volsky - Volsky then discussed it with Tadew Witold Syzyc, NY TIMES.
- p. 8 - Syzyc had developed friendship with many Cubans. incl Ambassador John C. Wickey. Syzyc reportedly could see both Kennedys & Bundy any time he wanted.
- early '63 - Syzyc arranged an int. in Wash with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor.
- 11112661
- Volsky & Syzyc then met with Robert Heronitch, a senior official in the Dep't of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with approval. CIA assigned it to Miami station - known as AMTRUNK
- p. 8
- ~~SECRET~~
- p. 9 AMTRUNK - conceived as identifying key personnel in Cuban armed forces who could be

~~SECRET~~

used to overthrow the castro regime.

p 9 - by Aug, 1963, events had still not progressed far

early Sept 1963 AMTNUH had 3
intelligence sources in Cuba:

Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue
Ramon Guin Hector Robello
Modesto Orozco Basulto

One of these sources, Guin, was close
to AMTNUH/1. p 9

- nothing developed over many months; by
1965 its security had been seriously
jeopardized & the decision was made
to end all connections. (p. 10)

p. 11 - CIA says they discuss this operation
because of its weakness from the beginning -
say that Szulc & Volsky are highly
suspect & are discredited - also are
other person.

11112662

~~SECRET~~

Tad Szulc - suspect since '48 when FBI
records said he was a Communist -
his daughter, Nicole Szulc, rptdly
an avowed Communist. She is believed
to be an agent of the Cuban DGI.
doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed

~~SECRET~~

but still alive.

p11 Jose Ajkuszyc Volsky - like Sydek,
of Polish origin; Volsky & Sydek
became acquainted during 59-60 in
Cuba. suspected of being a
Communist, not confirmed.

p.12 Jose Ricardo ~~Rico~~ Rabel Nunez

p.13 - involved in AMTRUNK ~~+~~ through
the JM WAVE station - accusation
that he was a Cuban agent -
never proven.

p.14 CIA says there was very little ^{proper} planning
and no ~~any~~ concrete planning of
AMTRUNK during JFK's life

11112663

NEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SYNDICATE OPERATION

p14 - mentions a by-line story by Paul Meekel
in the NY Times, 20-25 April, 1975,
which quoted Frank Sturgis.

Daily
Press

~~SECRET~~

Sturgis says the third assassin scheme
involved a bomb in Castro's office -
Sturgis says he knew Juan Orta.

~~SECRET~~

p. 15 - CIA says this news article is the first public reference to Juan Orta is the role of assassin in the plan against Castro.

p. 16 - Orta was the man the CIA had, in the operation with the syndicate, to kill Castro.

says that the plan failed (poison) because Orta lost his position in January, 1961 - prior to delivery of the pills in late Feb or early March 1961.

p. 16 says that Orta's role was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in 1961 - April. Left Cuba in 1964 & settled in Miami in Feb, 1965.

11112664

on p. 15 the rpt says that Slings claimed

(on a number of occasions that he had a ~~special relationship~~ ^{he} was an employee of the CIA, although no record of any such relationship.

"He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

p. 17 - Rpt says that because Sturgis knew of Orta's involvement in some plot it raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of info to Castro.

p. 17 - New York Daily News - 13 June 76 - refers to possible relationship btwn Sturgis & Trappicante - also mentions Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trappicante.

p. 17 - says that it is interesting to note that Juan Orta's availability to the Mafia was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from gambling interests. Then goes on to say two ways for Sturgis & Orta to have known each other

1. mutual gambling activities
2. heads of gambling activities

11112665

p. 18 NY Daily News - 1976 - story that Marie Loreny in 1960 acted for Sturgis in an attempt to assassinate Castro. This story says that soon after her mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

~~SECRET~~

Loreny claims that the plan involved the use of poison pills concealed

~~SECRET~~

in a jar of face cream, she said they dissolved & could not be used.

p. 18 - Rpt next mentions Oct 18, 1960 FBI memo re: Graniana - concludes that it involves a woman to kill Castro but that the date is too early for the CIA work. (no delivery until late Feb, 1961). Rpt says that the syndicate may have been moving on its own.

p. 19 Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Roselli said he knew Cuban exile leader, DeVarma, who might join. - mentions that Verona not satisfied with the CIA support of the exile movement to date & that the Miami Station suspected he was not keeping bargain with agency.

- concludes that Varma may have already been involved in plot with mafia when CIA approached him. Two FBI rpts bear on this:

1) 21 Dec 60 - Cum und. support for some Cuban.

p. 20 2) 18 Jan 61 - Varma one of those rec. support, not confirmed.

~~SECRET~~

11112666

~~SECRET~~

p20 - Rpt says that although the operation with maps called off after BOP (4-61), it seemed like it was still going on when re-activated in April, 1962.

p26 Agent Menaya in 1961 mentioning plans to kill Castro.

p26 3 messages - seem to relate to same plan - same agents.

27 March 1961 - sent by an agency asset, AM BRONC/5. - proposed sabotage of an elec. co. in Havana; could be coordinated with attempt against Fidel in public appearance at Sports Palace. "said that the attempt "against Fidel" (s) is accordance with general plan. "no record if this was answered.

p27 25 March 61 - same agent sent another message - said plan was scheduled for April 9th. Castro to talk at palace & "assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general shutdown of main electric plants in Havana."

~~SECRET~~

answered on 30 March - saying major effort should be launched on date you selected - the message addressed the general issue &

11112667

~~SECRET~~

made no comment or proposal to
kill Castro.

5 April 1961 - presumably from same
agent - mentions that the persons
he had been directed to contact only
had arms for 50 men. "① While
stating that the sabotage of the electric
company and 'possibly attempt on
Fidel' would be carried out 9 April,
he emphasized that to do so would
make it impossible to maintain a
clandestine organization in Cuba;
"your military aid is decisive. If
it does not come that date we are lost."

- no indication that the message was answered;
no further reference found.

p 27 - Rpt mentions that the case officer
responsible for one of them as well as the
files were reviewed.

AMBRONC/5 - agent who sent out the
message outlining the proposed sabotage
& attempt against Castro.

p 28 201 File open 15 July 1960

OA issued 31 JAN 62.

arrested 29 May 1962

executed 30 August 62.

reported that he never admitted being CIA;

11112668

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

name not in the book given Sen McGovern
by Castro.

p 29 AMCOAX/1 - one of those AMBRONC/5 was
used to contact. POA 5 Jan 61 -
arrested 17 Aug 61 - serving 30 yr
sentence - in book for Sen McGovern -
mission: organize paramilitary
alliances in Cuba

p 29 AMRUB/1 - another one AMBRONC/5
used to contact for his general plan
in April 1961.
arrested July 1961 - 30 yr sentence
name on list given to Sen McGovern
mission: organize resistance groups.

p 30 AMPANIL/7
- arrested 23 April 61 -
30 yr term - name among those
given McGovern - mission: organizing
resistance groups.

11112669

p 31 - the 9 April 61 mission by
AMBRONC/5 did not come off -
his mission was to organize resistance
groups - he had no express mission
to hit Castro personally, although
it is clear no specific objection was
raised when he mentioned attempting
to do so.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- the other men, none of whom had an assassination mission, are now serving 30 yr terms.

p 32 another agent message dtd 4 June 61 - asked about a man who called himself Morastoni of the Italian Embassy - claimed to work for U.S. intelligence & to be in touch with the Martin Elena & others - who "have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." a reply dtd 6 June, stated that this info was untrue -

- the originator of the agent message cannot be identified.

p 33 another message 3 May 61 - from a member of Rev Recovery ~~in the~~ Movement in Cuba said "I will try to kill Fidel today" a reply 4 May told the agent & his companions to lay low -

11112670

- no follow-up message - agent possibly AMPUB/1, but ~~SECRET~~ his ~~own~~ mission did not include assassination.

~~SECRET~~

p28 - a debriefing of AmBRUNC/5 -
Nov 1960 - revealed he had contact
with people who had plotted killing Castro -
claimed to have had similar plan -

TABD - AMLASH

p1 - Not say that the ~~SSC~~ SSC report
implies that AMLASH was either an agent
for Castro, with the mission of provoking
a plot against Castro which in turn provided
Castro with the justification to kill Kennedy
(pp 3, 74, & 79 of SSC) or that AMLASH/1 was
so insecure that the operation became known
to Castro who then sought revenge.

Response by CIA - neither theory correct -
believe that the character of the
relationship b/w CIA & AMLASH before JFK's
death was so "insubstantial and inconclusive
that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1
to feel that he had any tangible CIA support
for plotting against Castro." p 1-2.
- little for him to report on leak.

Agency understanding of the Operation

March, 1959 - AMLASH/1 reported as telling
Castro of his dissatisfaction with the
situation in Cuba.

11112671

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 1961 - AMFLASH/1 met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there - occasion - the Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, & Peace.

- meeting arranged by AMWHIP/1 - long time friend of AMFLASH/1.

p3

- a dispatch in July, 1961, which gave a general review of operations against Cubans, described the meeting:

The station made an unsuccessful approach to AMFLASH/1 - AMFLASH apparently did not report the incident to his superior, however.

August, 1961 - AMWHIP/1 rptd plan by AMFLASH/1 to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival - AMFLASH/1 wanted to meet a friend of the case officer's. Do not know if the contact occurred.

June, 1962 - rpt that AMFLASH/1 would go to via Prague to World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMFLASH/1 was rpt as wanting to defect; would pass through Paris on return & hoped to meet AMWHIP/1 there.

~~SECRET~~

11112672

p3

- the FBI, who knew of AMWHIP/1's assoc with CIA, ~~also~~ met AMWHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA should he contact Paris Legal Attache

~~SECRET~~

p4.

July 1962 - CIA contacted AMU41P/1 - who said he was angry with the way the CIA handled the "planned defection" in Paris in August 1961. Plan was made for ~~the~~ a CIA case officer & AMU41P/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else to secure defection.

1st series of meetings with AMLASH/1, held in Helsinki on 1 Aug 62. AMLASH/1, said if he could do something really significant he was interested in returning to Cuba to carry on the fight.

p4.

Security hazard of meeting in Helsinki too often led to meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

AMLASH/1, next met on 16-17 Aug in Paris - AMU41P/1, & 2 case officers present.

AMLASH/1 given SW training & supplies -

20 August AMLASH/1, taken to Southern France for a demolition demonstration.

11112673

p5.

Case officer rpt on 17 August -

"There is no intention of [AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission, as requirement but recognizing this something he could on might try to carry out on his own initiative."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Headquarters replied next day:

"Strongly concur that no phy. elimination missions be given AMLASH/1." p 5

29 Aug 62 - AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana - last time he was met until he left Cuba 15 September, 1963.

Comment -

note that AMLASH/1 not a recruited agent during the above time - nor was he ever for that matter - as OA was never granted for this purpose.

- by end of Aug 1962 - CIA relationship with AMLASH had made no real progress.

- over a year passed until next contact by CIA

p 5. - critical period :: 5 Sept - 22 Nov 63.

AMLASH/1 attended Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 Sept to Sept 1963, as a rep. of the Cuban gov.

11112674

p 6 - met there by AMWH/1 & by the CIA case officer who was to take over the relationship with him.

~~SECRET~~

AMLASH/1 said he had written two SW messages (only 1 had been received)

~~SECRET~~

- CIA says they did not contact AMBLASH/1 for over one year because he never left Cuba.

p 6

- at this point (5 Sept 1963) there was "no evidence (that)... an assassination operation was intended", and it was "quite clear that it was not under consideration."

- the problem at that time was how to deal with the man.

- CIA did not feel AMBLASH was reliable enough to rely on at that point - viewed as a person of "uncertain ~~capabilities~~ capabilities."

p 8

7 Sept 63 cable - CIA feels this cable left things very much up in the air - cable said "AMBLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMBLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action."

11112675

p 8

the SSC thought that inside job referred to something against Castro; the CIA says it is a general comment about how to bring about change.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- also, CIA says AMLAHSH announcing a US plan of action - says this signifies that they may now still up in the air.

- CIA notes that at this point Book II states that "Characterization of this plan of the AMLAHSH operation is disputed" (p. footnote 17. CIA says any dispute only comes in the eye of the SSC.

SSC

p9

- also mentions an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, DANIEL HARKER, in which Castro said anti-Castro terrorism had the support of U.S. leaders.

intended inference - AMLAHSH, may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as their assassination plots. -

CIA response - "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLAHSH, by CIA officers as they proposed nothing & undertook nothing" p. 10.

11112676

AMLAHSH, - PARRIS - 14 Sept - to attend a meeting of ALLIANCE FRANCAISE. trip actually for an extended vacation, where he intended to report to Castro later.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

on 16 Sept - he wrote AMWHIP, & said that he did not intend to be interviewed by your friend again. (referring to CIA case officer).

3 Oct 63 - case officer still went to Paris -

11 Oct 63 - case officer called Hdq - ~~advised~~ ^{said} that AMLASTH/1 claimed to have the men, people & equip to overthrow Castro w/out U.S. assistance.

p 11.

AMLASTH/1 rptd. as making a meeting with a senior official, presumably Robert Kennedy, to be sure of U.S. support.

21 Oct cable to Wash rptd 17 Oct meeting with AMLASTH/1 - wants U.S. support if his op is successful.

Desmond Fitzgerald - then Chief of Sp. Affairs Staff - going to France on other business - & undertook to meet AMLASTH - plan for the meeting:

11112677

- 11 Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting (AMLASTH/1) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is a change of the present gov. in Cuba. 11
(Emphasis added)

p 11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

29 Oct - Fitz - AMLAASH/1 in Paris -
up as a spokesman for Robert F. Kennedy.
3rd person at meeting - case officer who was
the interpreter.

13 Nov - memorandum summarizing the meeting -
goal \Rightarrow support forthcoming only after
a real camp has been effected and
the group is positive to request U.S. support

p. 12

p. 13

\rightarrow in 1967 ICG Report
Fitz recalled that AMLAASH/1 repeatedly made
reference to the need for an assassination weapon -
he wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic
lens, or some other weapon that could be
used to kill Carter from a distance. Fitz
said he rejected this request.

NOTE: the case officer's memo did not
refer specifically to assassination or
a weapon. merely says that nothing
of operational nature discussed; AMLAASH/1
did ~~request, however~~, desire to know,
however, what technical support could
be given.

~~SECRET~~

11112678

14 NOV 63 - AMWHIP/1 met in N.Y.C \Rightarrow rpt
on AMLAASH/1 reaction to the Oct 29 meeting -
~~he~~ he related:
not happy about no tech. support.
- could not understand why they would
not give him technical support

~~SECRET~~

p14

CIA note that at the point it was clear that AMLASH was told there would be no US support until after the joint - contrary to statement by SSC (p 18) of Final Report to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 interpreted the put off by Fitzgerald.

- also cites July 1964 FBI report as evidence that AMLASH knew he had been turned down on Oct 29 by Fitzgerald.

p15

following the 14 Nov meeting with AMLASH/1, the CIA reviewed what could be done to maintain contact with AMLASH -

on 19 Nov 63 Fitz approved telling AMLASH/1, he would be given a cache inside Cuba - it could, if he requested it, include high powered rifle w scope.

19 Nov - AMLASH/1 told CIA officer he planned to return to Cuba

20 Nov - Hdq cabled Paris & requested that AMLASH delay departure to permit one more meeting which AMLASH requested.

~~SECRET~~

11112679

~~SECRET~~

that same day AMLAASH agreed to remain -

p 16 - the CIA says still no specific offer was made - says that AMLAASH/1 agreed to stay "if it is something interesting." Case officer replied "he could not assure it is interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLAASH had requested."

- Case officer arrived from Wash in Paris on the morning of the 22nd - met AMLAASH/1, late in the afternoon - learned of Kennedy's arrival as they left the meeting - probably were meeting when Kennedy was shot

p 16 - Conclusion by CIA

p 16 "Whatever the relationship with AMLAASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLAASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Was he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless & leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro."

~~SECRET~~

11112680

~~SECRET~~

p23 AMLASH was arrested - does not say when served
10 yrs of a 30 yr term - his public trial
did not mention his agency assoc for March 1961 to
Nov 1964.

also, when Castro - McJannet list of people -
AMLASH/1 among those - the reported period,
however, did not include March 1961 to
Nov 64.

IG Report - 1977 - completed. - all TABS
(A - G)

11112681

~~SECRET~~